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 Anscombe famously argues that to act intentionally is to act under a description, 
and that “it is the agent's knowledge of what he is doing that gives the descriptions 
under which what is going on is the execution of an intention.”1  Further, she takes 
‘knows’ to mean that the agent can give these descriptions herself.2  Since non-rational 
animals (hereafter ‘animals’) cannot describe anything, it would seem to follow that 
animals cannot act intentionally.  However, she denies this, insisting that although 
animals cannot express intentions, they can have them.3  And she speculates that those 
who have a problem with this assume that the relevant description must “in some sense 
[be] written into something inside the agent.”4  But this is an odd charge for her to 
make, given that she herself holds that a human agent can have an intention only if they 
can express it.  In fact, the difficulty surrounding the idea of animal intention is not the 
result of any facile assumption, but indicative of a genuine philosophical puzzle, one 
that—if the argument to follow is correct—Anscombe’s approach to action helps us 
resolve.  To resolve it is to understand the difference that rationality makes to 
intentional action.  
 
1 Anscombe 2000, 87. 
2 Anscombe 2000, 48. 
3 Anscombe 2000, 5. 
4 Anscombe 1979, 221. 
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What the Difference is Not: Practical Knowledge 
  
How can we say that humans and animals both act intentionally while 
maintaining that linguistic expressibility is an essential characteristic of only human 
action?  Matt Boyle has sketched the following approach to the general issue: we should 
attempt to articulate a determinate conception of how the human capacity for speech 
transforms and does not merely add to animal agency.  Then we would have grounds for 
thinking of human action—together with the network of capacities that comprise it—as 
essentially, and not just accidentally rational.   
Animals, on this sort of view, are a class of intermediate case between entities 
who admit only of ‘reasons why’ explanation and those admit also of ‘reasons for’ 
explanation.  We can say why a house collapsed be appealing to a reason, but do not 
take the reason to be a reason for the house.  We can say why a person opened a drawer 
by appealing to what was a reason for them.  When a cat paws open a cupboard door 
and we say why by citing its knowledge of the location of the bag of treats, we appeal 
neither to a mere reason why nor to a full-blown reason for.  The cat does not, to deploy 
a phrase common in philosophical discussions, grasp the reason qua reason.  But how 
to interpret this phrase?  I hope to make progress on the task through an examination of 
the parallel quandary concerning intentional action. 
Martin Gustafsson has recently argued that Anscombe herself held a 
transformational conception of rationality:   
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[Anscombe’s] talk of how animal activities and powers are “transposed 
to a new key” in human life, due to “the intellective principle” of which 
an essential element is language, clearly suggests that she thinks the 
human way of having intentions is essentially linguistic even if the 
animal way of having intentions is not, and even if this difference 
between human and animal intentionality is not a matter of mere 
ambiguity in our use of the word “intention.”5  
What is the ground for thinking that ‘intentional’ and its cognates have, if not univocal, 
then at least continuous sense  in their application to human and animal action?  
Anscombe says this: 
…[W]e describe what further [animals] are doing in doing something 
(the latter description being more immediate, nearer to the merely 
physical): the cat is stalking a bird in crouching and slinking along with 
its eye fixed on the bird and its whiskers twitching. The enlarged 
description of what the cat is doing is not all that characterises it as an 
intention….but to this is added the cat's perception of the bird, and 
what it does if it catches it. The two features, knowledge and enlarged 
description, are quite characteristic of description of intention in acting. 
Just as we naturally say ‘The cat thinks there is a mouse coming’, so we 
also naturally ask: Why is the cat crouching and slinking like that? and 
give the answer: It's stalking that bird; see, its eye is fixed on it. We do 
 
5 Gustafsson 2016 210-211. 
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this, though the cat can utter no thoughts, and cannot give expression to 
any knowledge of its own action, or to any intentions either.6  
Human and animal action are both intentional in virtue of the fact that their 
actions admit of nested, teleologically-linked descriptions that radiate out from nearer 
to farther, from ‘the merely physical’ to those that reflect their further-from-the-‘merely 
physical’ purposes.  Crucial is the role of perception and action in characterizing the 
contents of these distal descriptions.  What transformative change, then, does the 
capacity for speech bring?   
A tempting answer invokes practical knowledge.  The difference between humans 
and animals, according to this thought, is that humans have a special kind of knowledge 
of their intentional action.  Practical knowledge entails the ability to say what one is 
doing, but not on the basis of observation or evidence.  Animals, the thought continues, 
don’t know what they’re doing.  Practical knowledge might thus be seen as an aspect of 
the self-consciousness that characterizes the specifically rational form of animality. 
Gustafsson seems to see it this way.  In reviewing the characteristics of human 
action that might be said to turn on their expressibility, he says “human intention 
transgresses the biological boundaries that limit animal intention, and [] this 
transgression means that it interlocks with concepts such as freedom, self-
consciousness, and practical knowledge.”7  By practical knowledge, he means this:  “The 
language-using agent’s conception of what she is doing—her practical knowledge of 
what she is doing—is “the cause of what it understands” (Anscombe 2000, 87), and thus 
 
6 Anscombe 2000, 86-87. 
7 Gustafsson 2016, 232. 
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plays as important a part in the constitution of her intention as the action she performs 
in order to reach the intended goal.”8 
 But as tempting as it might be, this suggestion is wrong both exegetically and 
philosophically.  When Anscombe endorses the Thomistic doctrine that practical 
knowledge is “the cause of what it understands”, she means at least this much: the 
reality of an intentional action is posterior to the agent’s conceiving of that action.  If 
animals lack the capacity to form such conceptions, they are also incapable of the sort of 
intentional action elucidated in Intention.  Thus, if practical knowledge were the 
exclusive possession of rational creatures, it would be hard to avoid the conclusion that 
we are, after all, simply equivocating when we speak of both humans and animals as 
acting intentionally.   
Anscombe is clear in the passage above that animals are knowers: we see them as 
acting intentionally only insofar as we see them as possessing perceptual knowledge.  
And note too that she says that we give ‘enlarged descriptions’ of the cat’s behavior 
despite the fact that it “cannot give expression to any knowledge of its own action…”.  
She does not say that it has no such knowledge, only that it can give no expression to 
any knowledge.  This precisely matches her view of animal intentions: animals have 
them but cannot express them.  Thus, she finishes the sentence with “…or to any 
intentions either.”  Animals can give expression neither to their intentions nor to their 
knowledge of their intentions.  But they have both. 
Intention and practical knowledge, on her view, are inextricable.  It will be 
instructive to deepen our understanding of their inextricability.  Consider, for the sake 
 
8 Gustafsson 2016, 225. 
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of contrast, biological teleology.  The right ventricle pumps blood to the lungs.  This is 
the job of the right ventricle; if it doesn’t do this, it fails.  Pumping blood to the lungs 
isn’t merely what it typically does, but what it is supposed to do; this aim normatively 
governs its behavior.  Still, there is no temptation to think of pumping the blood to the 
lungs as something that the right ventricle intends to do.  Why not?  A key difference, as 
she emphasizes in the passage just excerpted, is that animals are guided in their action 
by perception.  As such, they are knowers.  It is because the cat has knowledge 
concerning the location of its prey that it can slink towards the tree in light of the fact 
that there is a bird sitting on one of its branches.  One has the ability to x in light of the 
fact that p only if one knows that p.9  But among the facts an agent can act in light of is 
the fact that she is x-ing, where x-ing is her intentional action.  This is practical 
knowledge.  What makes this knowledge practical is that the agent has an ability to act 
in light of the fact that she is x-ing not because she knows by observation that she is x-
ing but simply because x-ing is what she is up to.  In other words, part of what it is to be 
x-ing is to be eligible to do various other things in light of the fact that one is x-ing, and 
thus because one knows practically that one is x-ing.  The cat, insofar as it is stalking the 
bird, is eligible to do various other things because it’s stalking the bird.  It can, e.g., slink 
instead of scramble.  It takes a route that keeps it out of the sight-line of the bird 
because it is stalking the bird.  Thus the cat must know it is stalking the bird.  The 
ventricle pumps blood to the pulmonary artery because it’s pumping blood to the lungs.  
It does the former in order to do the latter.  But it does not do the former even partly in 
virtue of its knowledge that it is doing the latter.  Yet this is precisely the situation of the 
 
9 See Hyman 1999 for an influential defense of this claim.    
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cat: without practical knowledge, there would be no making sense of the fact that it is 
adopting various situationally-specific means in light of its end.  Practical knowledge 
must itself be part of what is “transposed into a new key” by the acquisition of 
rationality.  
 Consider now the following claims of Boyle’s, who in elaborating the idea of a 
transformative conception of rationality, says this: 
It is perhaps even more obvious in this case that the generic notions of 
being an agent, doing something, and pursuing a goal apply to both 
rational and nonrational animals. What is perhaps less obvious is that 
agency, doing and goal-directedness take a different form in the rational 
case. Nevertheless, it is widely recognized that there is a sense of “doing 
something” that applies only to rational creatures: we are the only 
creatures that act intentionally. Furthermore, it is widely conceded that 
a condition of the applicability of ascriptions of doing in this distinctive 
sense is that the creature should be doing what it is doing knowingly, in 
virtue of exercising its power to determine what ends are worth 
pursuing and how to pursue them.10 
As should now be clear, I do not think that the rational/non-rational difference is 
properly marked by the presence/absence of intentions, or by the presence/absence of 
practical knowledge.  But a slight modification of Boyle’s final remark in this passage 
yields what I take to be central to resolving the puzzle of animal intention: only rational 
 
10 Boyle 2012, 21-21 
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creatures have practical knowledge in virtue of exercising a power to determine what 
ends are worth pursuing.  Practical thought in humans is the exercise of such a power.  
It’s not that humans do and animals don’t act knowingly.  It’s that what it comes to for 
the human to act knowingly is different from what it comes to for the animal to act 
knowingly, on account of the difference in the power the exercise of which constitutes 
the relevant species of practical knowledge.  
Gustafsson distinguishes human and animal intentions as follows: 
[W]hereas the intentions manifested in the actions of a speechless brute 
are settled by biological norms and the surrounding circumstances, the 
human intention-action nexus is not thus determined but is instead 
characterized by the agent’s capacity to set her own goals by means of 
language. This is the basic sense in which language is essential to 
human intentionality.… I can specify ends to myself, and this inscribes 
my actions in the sort of teleological patterns that are characteristic of 
human intentional action— patterns which cannot be accounted for 
merely in terms of biological norms and capacities.11  
This might be misread as asserting that the key difference between human and 
animal action is a matter of the range of their possible intentions, but in fact the key 
difference is qualitative.  It emerges most clearly in the distinctively human capacity for 
pure intentions.  Gustafsson again: 
 
11 Gustafsson 2016, 225 
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Anscombe says, “a man can form an intention which he then does 
nothing to carry out, either because he is prevented or because he 
changes his mind: but the intention itself can be complete, although it 
remains a purely interior thing” (2000, 9). If I am right, she would not 
say the same thing about a cat….  Anscombe thinks that a cat’s intention 
to catch a bird cannot exist without some actual instrumental behavior, 
some actual “carrying out” of that intention. By contrast, she seems to 
be suggesting that in the human case, intentions do not require any 
such actual carrying out.12 
I take this to be right, both exegetically and philosophically.  The possibility of 
pure intentions is a function of the human capacity to set their own goals by means of 
language.  Without this capacity, an aim exists only as manifested in behavior.  
This claim does not entail that a restrained cat cannot, say, intend to catch a 
mouse.  The cat presumably would still be struggling against the restraints, waiting to 
pounce, i.e., would be doing various things (however vainly) in order to catch the mouse. 
Nor does it mean that animal intention is, unlike human intention, reducible to 
behavior.  The point is rather that the animal has no purely internalized practical 
consciousness, no practical orientation towards the world that does not manifest itself in 
what it does—where doing in the relevant sense encompasses waiting, hiding etc.13   A 
 
12 Gustafsson 2016, 225. 
13 Some might argue here that I am selling cats—or perhaps some other animals—short.  Ultimately, 
however, my aim here is to draw a line, not to say who falls on what side of the line.  There are, I contend, 
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human, by contrast, can make up their mind to catch a mouse and at the same time put 
off doing anything in order to catch it until later.  Human intentions are a kind of 
judgment, which, like judgments in general, extend into the future without staying ‘on 
one’s mind’.  To put off doing something, or even thinking about doing something, is not 
tantamount to a change of mind or the abandonment of an aim.  
It is the distinctively human capacity for judgment that Boyle has in mind when 
he speaks of practical knowledge as the exercise of a power to determine what ends are 
worth pursuing.  The intention of a rational creature is a judgment.  Specifically, it is the 
sort of judgment in which practical reasoning concludes: a judgment that an action is to-
be-done.  For the rational, practical knowledge is a function of the ability to reason 
about the good or, what is the same thing, to make practical judgments.  We have 
knowledge of our intentions and actions because they are our practical judgments.   
These remarks are, to be sure, programmatic; much detail would have to be 
added in order to make good on the promise of illumination.  I’ve tried to do some of 
this in previous work,14 and I hope to make additional progress here.  Negatively, the 
essential point thus far has been this:  To see a cat as doing one thing in order to do 
another is to see it as acting with knowledge of what it is doing.  Thus the 
transformation of practical knowledge is part of what must be understood to solve the 
puzzle of animal action.  Practical knowledge is not the difference rationality makes.  
Positively, I have sketched the thought that human action is an actualization of a 
 
two forms of agency, the rational and the non-rational.  If this distinction does not correspond neatly to 
the that between the human and the non-human, so be it. 
14 Marcus 2012, 2018. 
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capacity to make judgments about what is to-be-done and that this confers on human 
intentions a kind of independence from behavior.  This assessment will dovetail with 
reflections to follow on the distinctive character of the togetherness of the states of a 
rational mind.   
 
The Instrumental Law 
 
Our question is how the possession of language transforms intentional action.  
The transformation, I will argue presently, can be understood in terms of the different 
sources of unity in the practical consciousness of humans and animals.  I will illustrate 
the point by discussing two variations of a law connecting an intended end with the 
means necessary to achieve it.  Some version of this law holds quite generally.  But what 
explains its holding in the case of humans and animals is different.  In the human case, 
it holds in virtue of our possession of language and the capacity for normative self-
determination that it confers.  In animals, it holds because of the immanence of 
intentions in animal action.   
Stephen Finlay argues for what I will refer to as the unqualified version of  
The Psychological Instrumental LawUQ: It is impossible for an agent to 
intend an end and fail to intend what they believe to be the necessary 
means.   
 He says this: 
So long as I have this belief in the necessity of going through the event 
of my turning on the light in order to reach the event of my spotting the 
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kitten, my deliberative efforts to perform the necessary means to 
spotting the kitten will of necessity track the goal of turning on the light 
– which simply means (given the identification of intending with 
tracking) that so long as I have this means-belief, my intention to 
perform the necessary means is an intention to turn on the light. So 
long as I believe that the necessary means to my intended end is z, I do 
indeed intend to do z.15   
According to Finlay, once I know (or believe) that y-ing requires z-ing, then in 
intending to y, I thereby also intend to z.  z-ing is now fused in my practical 
consciousness to y-ing.  Instrumental knowledge (or belief), so long as it lasts, fuses a 
necessary means to the relevant end. 
Christine Korsgaard rejects the ‘fusing’ picture, famously arguing that “there 
seem to be plenty of things that could interfere with the motivational influence of a 
given rational consideration. Rage, passion, depression, distraction, grief, physical or 
mental illness: all these things could cause us to act irrationally, that is, to fail to be 
motivationally responsive to the rational considerations available to us.”16  Interestingly, 
she also says this: “The necessity [of rational considerations] may lie in the fact that, 
when they do move us-either in the realm of conviction or in that of motivation-they 
move us with the force of necessity. But it will still not be the case that they necessarily 
move us.”17   
 
15 Finlay 2009, 16.  See Lee 2018 for a more recent defense of this sort of view. 
16 Korsgaard 1986, 13.  See also Korsgaard 1997, 49. 
17 Korsgaard 1986, 14. 
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In disputing the unqualified version of the Psychological Instrumental Law, 
Korsgaard is concerned primarily to argue for a normative, rather than metaphysical 
connection between an intended end and a necessary means.  But in so doing, she also 
in effect, advances a qualified version of a metaphysically articulated Instrumental Law. 
The Psychological Instrumental LawQ: It is impossible for an agent to 
intend an end and fail to intend what they believe to be the necessary 
means, unless they are being irrational.  
In conceiving of rational considerations as operating with a kind of necessity, she 
opposes the idea that it is open to one who is being rational to recognize the reason and 
yet fail to comply.18  Hence, they move us with the force of necessity.  Yet irrationality is 
a possibility, so they do not necessarily move us.  There is more to this than the 
paradoxical-sounding claim that reasons necessarily move us except when they don’t.   
 I will discuss the “realm of conviction” first, and then move to “the realm of 
motivation”.  Note that a belief (like an intention) does not need to be in mind or 
actively guiding behavior in order to be held by a rational being.  I take this to be a 
familiar point, often (though I think misleadingly) marked by the distinction between 
dispositional and occurrent belief.  Second, whereas it is possible to hold contradictory 
beliefs, it is a condition of the possibility of doing so that they are not both in mind.  
That is, to understand someone as believing both that p and also that ~p, we need to 
 
18 However, as Lavin 2004 points out, she is not always as clear as she might be on this point.  See also 
Fix, ms.  
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understand one or the other belief as temporarily outside of the scope of the subject’s 
scrutiny, on account of, e.g., distraction, self-deception, repression, etc.   
Here’s an example:  An absent-minded professor is preparing a sack lunch for 
their children, placing folders and books in their bags when they receive a text-message 
announcing that school has been cancelled for the day due to classrooms having been 
flooded by the recent rains.  They are briefly overwhelmed by frustration over being 
deprived of another day of writing and brood over how frequently the school seems to 
shut down for one reason or another—all the while continuing to ready their children’s 
things for a day at school.  To make sense of the latter, we need to understand them as 
believing that their children are going to school; to make sense of the former, we need to 
understand them as believing that their children are not going to school.  They hold 
contradictory beliefs.   
It is a crucial feature of the intelligibility of the absent-minded professor that 
their mind is in the relevant sense absent in relation to the behavior that grounds our 
ascription of one but not the other of their incompatible beliefs.  This sort of lack of 
togetherness amongst their beliefs is required to make sense of belief-attributions such 
as:  They believe that the kids are going to school (hence they’re preparing sack-lunches) 
but they also believe that the kids are not going to school (hence they’re mentally 
formulating an angry note to the principle concerning the frequency of unexpected 
school closings).  We should say this: it is not necessarily true that we don’t hold 
contradictory beliefs and also true that, in a sense, we can’t.  It is impossible to hold 
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both that p and that ~p clearly and distinctly.19 Let’s call this The Psychological Law of 
Non-ContradictionQ.20 
I will say more about this principle in a moment but let us first return to the 
Instrumental Law.  Korsgaard’s idea is that “rage, passion, depression, distraction, grief, 
physical or mental illness” can render one insensitive to one’s aim and/or instrumental 
knowledge.  Consider Alan, a philosophy graduate student.  After a decade of slaving 
away on a dissertation, it is on the verge of completion.  A wonderful job in the 
department of his dreams has improbably been offered to him on the condition that he 
defend his dissertation the following semester.  To do so, he must submit the final 
version in the morning.  But the last changes are proving difficult, and Alan cannot bear 
handing in an imperfect document.  Furthermore, he is haunted by visions of public 
humiliation at the hands of one committee member in particular.  His friends assure 
him that the defense is just a formality, and that the dissertation will be approved, but 
this doesn’t help.  They warn him that if he fails to produce, he will be expelled from the 
program and his academic career will be over, but this just makes it worse.  At 3am, 
Adderall-addled Alan is overwhelmed by frustration and despair, and dumps a pot of 
coffee on his laptop, thereby destroying (what he knows to be) the only copy of his 
dissertation.   
 
19 Cf. Davidson, who in clarifying his proposal that contradictory beliefs requires a division in the mind 
says this:  “I spoke of the mind as being partitioned, meaning no more than that a metaphorical wall 
separated the beliefs which, allowed into consciousness together, would destroy at least one” (Davidson 
2004, 220). 
20 My discussion of this principle and its ontological correlate are deeply indebted to Kimhi 2018, though 
much of what I say here is opposed the views espoused there. 
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Did Alan suddenly cease to know that the preservation of his laptop was required 
to get his dream job?  Did he suddenly give up on his long- and deeply-held ambition?  
It is more plausible, I would think, that frustration and despair momentarily got the 
better of him, and that he did what he knew would undermine an intended end.  That 
reasonable people could disagree about how to describe this case is a sign of the strain 
that the need for precision in philosophy puts on our ordinary concepts.  On the one 
hand, he comes undone precisely because an end he can’t relinquish requires an action 
he can’t bear.  On the other hand, we feel that in his agony he must have lost sight of his 
aim.  But these are consistent: we lose sight of an aim—or a bit of knowledge—that we 
nonetheless possess.  These are states that permit lapses into less than full 
consciousness.  One can intend an end or have a piece of knowledge at a time when they 
are the farthest thing from one’s mind.   
Korsgaard holds that whereas it is not necessarily true that we do what (we know) 
is required to achieve our ends, when we do so, we do so because we must.  It is 
impossible to clearly and distinctly know one’s aim and the relevant instrumental fact 
and fail to act.  This is not simply:  it is impossible to fail to be moved by such reasons 
except when we aren’t so moved.  Suppose, by contrast, that we said not just “an adult 
human has 206 bones” but also “it is impossible for an adult human to have fewer than 
206 bones, unless he had a limb amputated, or a bone removed, a congenital condition, 
or something weird like that.”  The latter is vacuous, since having had a limb amputated 
does not (nor do any of the other exceptions) explain how it’s possible that someone 
could have fewer than 206 bones, it explains only how they actually came to have fewer 
than 206 bones.  In the case of our qualified laws, the various psychological conditions 
explain self-contradiction and instrumental incoherence by postulating a psychological 
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distortion that makes the irrationality intelligible.  These are (or would be, if Korsgaard 
is right) conditions in which something interferes with the subject’s appreciation of a 
rational requirement.  It is (or would be) because their judgment is clouded by 
distraction, self-deception, repression, etc, that these sorts of irrationality are possible.  
Korsgaard may be wrong.  But if she is, it is not because there is something amiss about 
the very idea of being moved by a reason with the force of necessity even though one 
might not have been so moved.  
This will be my claim in what follows:  The Psychological Instrumental Law 
governs both humans and animals, but the explanation of why is different, and this 
difference amounts to a difference in the nature of the unity of the practical 
consciousness of rational and non-rational beings.  A characterization of this difference 
will provide a crucial element of an Anscombean account of the transformative effect of 
rationality on intentional action.21 
 
Rational Instrumental Coherence 
 
 
21 There is a different strand of thought in Anscombe that one might bring to bear on the difference 
between human and animal action.  In Anscombe 1982 she invokes a distinction among intentional acts 
between ‘human actions’ and the wider class of ‘acts of a human being’ (e.g., idly stroking one’s beard).  
Only the former, she argues, are “under the command of reason”.  She might be read on this basis as 
holding that mere acts of a human being are the very same acts as those of an animal.  I would resist this 
both as an interpretation of Anscombe—her focus in the essay is morality and not intention—and as a 
philosophical doctrine: it leaves the puzzle with which I began unresolved.  But a discussion of the issue 
here would take us too far afield.  
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 Is it or is it not impossible to possess an aim while failing to intend what one 
knows to be necessary for achieving it?  Korsgaard says “yes”; Finlay says “no”.  How 
one comes down on this issue will be determined at least in part by how one describes 
cases such as those of the absent-minded professor and Alan the philosophy grad 
student: whether belief or intention in such cases is judged deviant to the point of 
disqualification.  I’m inclined to agree with Korsgaard, and for that reason and for the 
sake of rhetorical simplicity, I will from here on out simply assume she is right.  But the 
crucial point, which I would argue holds regardless of how the Korsgaard/Finlay dispute 
shakes out, is this: the Psychological Instrumental Law (in whichever form you like) has 
different sources in rational and non-rational creatures.22  
Rational creatures, I contend, are governed by the Psychological Instrumental 
Law in virtue of their grasp of 
The Ontological Instrumental Law: It is impossible to achieve an aim if 
one fails to take the necessary means. 
What makes it impossible for the means-intention and the end-intention of a rational 
creature to fall into incoherence, when they can’t fall into incoherence, is that we grasp 
the Ontological Instrumental Law.  Since animals do not grasp it, something else 
explains their not falling into instrumental incoherence. 
 
22 Korsgaard takes the possibility of failure to show that what explains the Psychological Instrumental Law 
is that we are guided by an Instrumental Norm (roughly: do what your ends require), a thesis that 
threatens a Humean picture of practical reason.  But I take no stand here on the question of whether we 
are guided by such a norm, nor, for that matter, on the question of whether such a norm provides reasons 
for doing what our ends require.  (But the answer to both is ‘yes’.) 
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Consider again The Psychological Law of Non-ContradictionQ.  There are 
conditions under which it is impossible for us to hold contradictory beliefs.  What 
explains this?  Not that such a pair is the metaphysical analogue of matter and anti-
matter.  Rather, it is the fact that without the distorting effects of the above-mentioned 
conditions, one would have to see that p and ~p could not both be true.  One cannot 
clear-headedly affirm and deny that p precisely because the act of affirmation itself 
depends on an understanding that affirmation and denial are incompatible acts.  One 
only counts as affirming insofar as one understands what one is doing in affirming 
precisely as standing in opposition to denying.    
Our beliefs are thus characterized by a form of togetherness whose exclusion of 
contradictories in paradigmatic instances is a function of our understanding of the 
impossibility of their joint truth.  This amounts to a form of rational necessity.  
Necessity because what is at issue is genuine impossibility.  Rational because what 
explains the necessity is our rationality: our grasp of the mutual exclusion of truth and 
falsehood.  The Psychological Law of Non-ContradictionQ—it is impossible for a subject 
to believe both that p and ~p unless they are being irrational—is thus explained by the 
rational agent’s grasp of The Ontological Law of Non-Contradiction: it is impossible for 
both p and ~p to be true. 
The same holds in the realm of motivation.  There are conditions under which it 
is impossible to intend an end and fail to intend what one knows to be the necessary 
means.  What explains this?  Without the distorting effects of the above-mentioned 
conditions, one would have to see that one will not achieve one’s aim unless one pursues 
the relevant means.  One would have unobstructed access to one’s instrumental 
knowledge and also to the relevant aim.  We cannot intentionally and clear-headedly 
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both pursue x-ing and avoid what’s required for x-ing, i.e., pursue and avoid x-ing: these 
are incompatible acts.  They are incompatible precisely because the (intentional) pursuit 
of any end requires a grasp of the fact that pursuit excludes avoidance.  Here again we 
have rational necessity.  When it is impossible to violate the Psychological Instrumental 
Law, it is because of our grasp of the Ontological Instrumental Law.   
Suppose I’m boarding a train because I’m going to St. Louis, where the ‘because’ 
signals a rational connection.  You ask: “Why are you boarding the train?”  I answer: 
“because I’m going to St Louis.”  “Don’t do it—trains are such a drag!”.  “But the airport 
has been shut down, the highways are closed, it’s too far to walk, and this is the very last 
train.”  “Still, I advise against it.”  “So you are saying that I should just cancel the trip?”  
“No, just don’t take the train.”  At this point, you have simply ceased to make sense.  
What you are saying is incoherent.  My rejection of your suggestion—that I go to St. 
Louis but don’t take the train—is grounded in my rationality, in my understanding of 
means-end coherence.  Even if Finlay is right and it is impossible to take up your 
suggestion, this impossibility has its source in our rationality.  And if, as I have been 
assuming, Finlay is wrong and there is a possibility that I take up your suggestion—on 
account of one of the above-mentioned conditions—it is because our understanding 
loses its sway over our behavior. 
More generally, one might say this: the source of the unity of the rational mind is 
a grasp of the fundamental conditions of theoretical and practical reality, which I have 
represented as the Ontological Instrumental Law and Ontological Law of Non-
Contradiction.  No creature that fails to grasp these conditions is capable of theoretical 
or practical judgment.  Animals have no such grasp.  I present no argument here for this 
latter contention.  But note that even those who hold that the difference between human 
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and animal belief is merely one of range would have to concede that the conceptual 
sophistication required for the grasp of these laws is outside the range of the non-
rational.  What explains the governance of animals by the Psychological Instrumental 
Law and the Psychological Law of Non-Contradiction must therefore be different. 
 
Non-Rational Instrumental Coherence 
 
Anscombe, recall, holds that animals can have intentions but not express them.  
Why should this be?  Above, in elaborating Boyle and Gustafsson’s Anscombe-inspired 
conception of practical rationality, we arrived at the following: practical rationality is the 
power to determine what ends are worth pursuing.  And this power depends on the 
possession of language.  This makes possible pure intentions, intentions that the agent 
“does nothing to carry out, either because he is prevented or because he changes his 
mind”23  The Korsgaardian characterization of someone like Alan is plausible because a 
disconnectedness from one’s mental states is possible for rational creatures; one’s 
intentions can be ‘out of mind’.  This is only possible for a being whose practical 
consciousness transcends their behavior, since it implies the possibility of losing sight of 
one’s aims without their ceasing to be one’s aims.  It is also because human intentions 
transcend behavior that agents are capable of holding them up for scrutiny.  Human 
intentions are actualizations of a power of articulation and thus also of critical scrutiny.  
They are judgments.  
 
23 Anscombe 2000, 9. 
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 Animal intention, by contrast “cannot exist without some actual instrumental 
behavior, some actual “carrying out” of that intention.”24  Animal intentions, i.e., exist 
only as realized in their behavior.  Insofar as an animal fails to pursue a necessary 
means, it follows that the animal lacks the relevant aim.  The fusing picture is true of the 
animal mind.  Instrumental incoherence requires the possibility of a separation in the 
mind between the aim and what’s known to be necessary to achieve it, a possibility that 
is actualized in the human case by the various forms of irrationality that we have 
considered.  But a cat cannot separate slinking right now and catching the bird, if it 
believes that the former is required for the latter.  Such a separation cannot exist in the 
mind of the animal, whose inability to articulate makes it impossible.  Animals do no 
repress their beliefs or aims, or become otherwise alienated from them.  Animals of 
course can, or course be conflicted in their pursuit of end, but this conflict results at 
worst in wavering and reluctance, not in the back-burnering of an aim while another 
conflicting aim governs behavior.25  It is, in the end, the immanence of an animal’s 
practical consciousness in its behavior that is the source of its unity.  Language is a pre-
condition of instrumental incoherence.  Coherence, for animals, is a reflection of 
intentional immanence; for humans it is a function of rationality. 
 
Conclusion  
 
24 Gustafsson 2016, 225. 
25 As Luca Ferraro pointed out to me, the crucial point is not that an animal mind can’t be divided but that 
such divisions would require a fundamentally different sort of explanation, e.g. a split brain or something 
along those lines. 
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   My question in the foregoing was this:  How does rationality transform animal 
agency?  My answer is: by changing the source of the unity of practical consciousness.  
This, I submit, is progress on the puzzle of animal action.  Still, the intentions of animals 
remain deeply puzzling.  To give an action-explanation is to speak the mind of an agent. 
But how can one speak the mind of an agent whose mind is characterized by its 
unspeakability?26  Furthermore, if, as Korsgaard says, reasons operate on the will of a 
rational creature via their rationality, what plays the analogous role in the case of the 
non-rational?  There is also a residual puzzle about practical knowledge.  Perhaps, as I 
have argued elsewhere, practical knowledge of our action is just knowledge of a 
normative judgment.27  But then how should we understand the practical knowledge of 
animals?  
 I have relied, in characterizing rational agency, on an unexplicated notion of 
understanding, a capacity that I’ve linked to the possession of language.  The plausibility 
of my argument depends on the idea that language confers upon us a capacity to grasp 
truths such as the two ontological principles discussed above and, more generally, to 
make judgments.  Judgments are a kind of cognition that transcend behavior: they are 
what are held up for scrutiny in our explicit acts of reflection and deliberation.  This line 
of thought has a venerable historical pedigree, but is generally viewed with hostility by 
contemporary philosophers of mind.  It needs a robust defense.28 
 
 26 I owe this way of putting the difficulty to Adrian Haddock.   
27 Marcus 2018. 
28 See Marcus 2016. 
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 A final thought.  I argued above that part of what explains the impossibility of 
violating the psychological laws is that the subject grasps the ontological laws.  But the 
relevance of these laws to any specific circumstance depends upon the togetherness-in-
mind of the relevant mental states.  That is, among the conditions that can explain why 
someone might believe both p and not-p, might both intend to x while failing to do what 
they know is necessary for x-ing, is a failure to hold the two items together in 
consciousness: distraction and self-deception are two such conditions.  
But what is it for mental states to exhibit togetherness in the relevant sense?  The 
relevant sense is that these states are part of a single consciousness, a consciousness 
that takes in both at once.  This is self-consciousness.  By self-consciousness I don’t 
simply mean the characteristic of individual mental states: that they are, as such, known 
(and known in a special way) by the believer.  If it is impossible to hold a pair of mental 
states in mind at once, and the impossibility has its source in our understanding of the 
necessary falsehood of a conjunction or the undoability of one action without another, 
then it must be because, absent special circumstances, the subject has knowledge of not 
just the individual states they’re in but also of their combination.  And this knowledge is 
not itself a further state but rather a way of characterizing the togetherness.  It is also 
consciousness of the self.  For what one is conscious of is not simply a would-be 
disagreement but a would-be inconsistency.  And this depends on consciousness of a 
unified, single subject.  Ultimately, or so I would argue, the difference that rationality 
makes is self-consciousness.29 
 
29 Versions of this paper were presented at the 2019 St. Louis Conference on Reasons and Rationality and 
the 2019 Conference on Theoretical and Practical Self-Consciousness at the University of Patras.  Thanks 
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to those audiences and especially to James Conant, Luca Ferrero, Jeremy Fix, Martin Gustafson, Adrian 
Haddock, Jennifer Hornsby, Anselm Mueller, Jack Samuel, John Schwenkler, and Sergio Tenenbaum. 
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